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In early December, the U.S. President convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. His pledge was an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Not long after, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President stated, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

These divergent actions exemplifies the core principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on commerce and stopping hostilities—despite the fact that this fits with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson stated this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Mixed Signals

This pivot is significant, but experts warn it is premature to judge its results. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a senior fellow for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study forecasts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Neglect and Tensions

Unlike his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has broken out with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Conditional Action

A comparable confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have pushed the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

Similar to Other Powers

Some analysts characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.